
By Greg Reed
On September 16, the Federal Reserve raised short-term rates for the first time in over three years, moving its target range to 3.75% to 4.00%, then held steady on October 28. Two weeks after the hike, the 10-year Treasury reached 5.31%, its highest level since 2002. Apartment cap rates, meanwhile, averaged 5.6% over the 12 months through September, according to MSCI Real Capital Analytics. At that level, the 10-year Treasury alone sat within about 30 basis points of the trailing cap-rate average before a lender added any spread. Yields surged again in mid-November after October inflation data came in hotter than expected, lifting the 10-year to 5.15%. Whatever path rates take from here, lender spreads layered on Treasury yields leave many acquisitions borrowing above their going-in yields.
For property buyers, the question is how much negative leverage a transaction can absorb and whether its financing supports a credible path to stronger performance. Sponsors can’t control market benchmarks, but they can choose the terms that shape their financing costs and exit flexibility: rate type, upfront costs, loan term, and prepayment provisions.
The case for floating-rate debt has strengthened this year, though not because short-term rates have fallen. In early January, the five-year Treasury yielded about the same as SOFR. On November 13, it stood at 4.98%, compared with overnight SOFR of 3.90% the same day. Intermediate yields, which price the five- and seven-year fixed-rate loans many acquisition buyers rely on, have risen roughly 110 to 125 basis points since January, far outpacing the overnight benchmark.
That gap allows floating-rate loans to offer a lower initial coupon in many cases, depending on lender spreads and other terms. Their generally more manageable prepayment costs can suit acquisitions with a defined renovation or stabilization period, allowing sponsors to refinance or sell once improvements are reflected in operating performance.
Floating-rate options also extend beyond short-term bridge debt: Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae both offer floating-rate programs with terms of five to 10 years, and prepayment after a one-year lockout can be as low as a flat 1% premium. Fannie Mae’s structured ARM also allows conversion to a fixed rate after the lockout period.
The flip side is a Fed that’s resumed tightening, with the median September projection implying another 25-basis-point increase before year-end. The October inflation report reinforced that outlook. In the week ended November 13, the two-year Treasury yield rose more than 35 basis points, and futures markets moved to price a December hike as a near certainty, with some bets on a half-point uptick. If a quarter-point increase passed through to SOFR and the five-year Treasury held at its November 13 level, the benchmark gap would still be roughly 80 basis points before lender spreads.
The cushion thins quickly from there. Futures were pricing roughly 90 basis points of cumulative increases by September 2027, which would leave SOFR within about 20 basis points of the five-year’s November 13 yield. Floating-rate debt can offer a lower total cost if the benchmark advantage outweighs differences in lender spreads, hedging costs and exit charges over the hold. A rate cap limits benchmark exposure above its strike during the coverage period.
That protection has a cost, and the comparison must account for it. An interest-rate cap, any required replacement-cap reserves, and the loan’s rate floor can materially change the economics. Cap pricing has also moved against borrowers. Caps are priced off the forward SOFR curve and rate volatility, and with markets now expecting further hikes, protection at a given strike has become more expensive. If a borrower instead fixes a floating rate through a swap, potential swap termination costs also belong in the exit analysis.
Current savings and flexibility may justify floating-rate debt, but the acquisition still needs sufficient cash flow and liquidity to withstand rates remaining elevated or moving higher.
Paying an upfront fee for a lower coupon can reduce ongoing debt service and support stronger distributions. Where debt-service coverage constrains proceeds, as it often does at today’s rates, a buydown may also increase the supportable loan amount. However, other underwriting limits still apply: improving coverage will not necessarily produce additional proceeds if the loan is already constrained by loan-to-value or debt-yield requirements.
In a hypothetical five-year, interest-only transaction, a borrower paying two points on a $10-million loan would invest $200,000 at closing. Assume for this example that the payment buys a 50-basis-point rate reduction. Annual interest savings would then total approximately $50,000, producing a simple four-year payback before accounting for the time value of money. Where coverage is the binding constraint, a borrower could generally also expect about $500,000 in additional proceeds, or roughly $300,000 net of the upfront payment, though borrowing the larger amount would give back a portion of the $50,000 in annual savings.
If the buydown doesn’t add proceeds, the decision turns on the hold period. For investors expecting a longer hold and prioritizing current income, that exchange may be attractive. For IRR-driven capital anticipating a sale or refinance within two or three years, the same buydown might leave too little time to recover its cost.
A higher annual distribution doesn’t automatically produce a higher overall return once the upfront payment is considered. Sponsors should compare the buydown with other uses of that capital, including reducing leverage, funding improvements, or preserving operating reserves. On an amortizing loan, interest-only terms offer another way to improve early cash flow by deferring principal, though they may involve pricing or leverage tradeoffs.
A shorter maturity may align with an anticipated sale or recapitalization, but it also creates an earlier refinancing obligation. If renovations, leasing, or income growth take longer than expected, the sponsor may reach maturity before the property achieves its higher stabilized NOI, forcing a refinance or extension from a weaker position. Longer-duration financing provides breathing room, particularly when prepayment terms allow an economical early exit.
The spread between five- and 10-year Treasuries narrowed from 45 basis points on January 2 to 17 on November 13, reducing the benchmark-rate premium for longer-dated financing. Lender spreads,
amortization, prepayment structure and extension terms can become more important differentiators than maturity alone.
Sponsors should evaluate maturity, prepayment restrictions, and hedge costs and expiration together. Extension options also deserve close attention: the ability to extend often depends on financial tests, additional fees, or a principal paydown. Those requirements should be modeled at acquisition, alongside the expected cost of refinancing.
For an owner anticipating a sale or refinancing prior to loan maturity, the cost of early repayment can have a significant impact on net proceeds available to equity investors. That exposure deserves particular attention on fixed-rate loans originated at today’s elevated yields. With yield maintenance or defeasance, exit costs can be substantial if benchmark yields decline while a long protection period remains. The amount depends on the remaining payment schedule and the applicable yield-maintenance formula or cost of purchasing replacement collateral.
Some of that exposure can be negotiated at origination. Modified yield-maintenance structures can shorten the protected period and replace yield maintenance with a flat premium thereafter. A five-year loan, for example, might carry three years of yield maintenance followed by a 1% premium, compared with 4.5 years of yield maintenance under a standard structure. On a seven-year loan, the protected period might drop from 6.5 years to five, again followed by a 1% premium. Standalone step-down schedules provide another option.
More flexibility generally carries a pricing premium. Sponsors should compare additional carrying costs with potential exit savings at the expected sale or refinance date.
Not every acquisition requires new financing. Many multifamily properties still carry agency loans originated in 2020 and 2021, when fixed coupons in the 3% range were common. Depending on how values and income have moved since origination, the assumed balance may cover more or less of the purchase price than new financing would. Any shortfall has to be filled with equity or, where permitted, subordinate capital or a supplemental loan priced at today’s rates.
The effective cost of debt then becomes a blend of the in-place coupon on the assumed balance and current-market pricing on any additional debt. With the 10-year Treasury near 5%, the blended cost of financing can still sit below today’s market rate and may produce positive leverage on a deal that would carry negative leverage with new financing. The result depends on the acquisition cap rate and the debt-service constant of the combined financing, including amortization. Assumable debt can also help narrow the bid-ask gap, since a seller can market the below-market coupon as part of the asset and capture some of its value in the price.
The buyer’s first task is pricing that coupon correctly. The present value of the financing savings provides a starting point for assessing any price premium, adjusted for assumption costs and differences in leverage, amortization, and exit terms. The buyer also inherits the loan’s remaining maturity and repayment structure. A 10-year loan originated in 2021 matures in 2031, which may or may not suit the business plan, and any interest-only period may already have burned off.
Existing prepayment restrictions also matter, and lender approval may involve revised reserve or other requirements. Assumption fees and the approval process must be factored into the acquisition budget and closing timeline.
Acquisition underwriting should compare these alternatives using consistent property assumptions and several possible exit dates. The analysis should capture upfront equity, interim distributions, and net sale or refinancing proceeds, while testing slower income growth and less favorable financing conditions. Run side by side, that comparison can reveal differences that a rate quote alone will miss. Working with an experienced capital advisor helps ensure the analysis includes the full range of lenders and structures available to the deal.
The Takeaway: Negative leverage may narrow the margin for error, but it doesn’t eliminate opportunity. In a high-rate environment, financing structure is more than a cost-of-capital decision; it is a critical driver of investment performance. Aligning debt with the hold period, business plan, and investor objectives can be the difference between simply making a deal work and maximizing returns.
Greg Reed is a principal with Arcus Harbor Real Estate Capital, a Newport Beach, CA-based real estate capital advisory firm.
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