The Ministry of Commerce issued the document “China's Position on the So-Called “Overcapacity” issue on the 28th. The document points out that large exports and large surpluses are not equal to overcapacity. The surplus mainly reflects the difference between gross domestic savings and total investment, and mainly includes a surplus in trade in goods and services. Judging from the history of global economic development, manufacturing powers such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, and Germany have maintained surpluses for a long time, and it is also quite common for Germany and Japan to account for more than 6% of GDP with current account surpluses. Exports from emerging markets are growing rapidly, and Indonesia, Mexico, etc. have all become surplus countries, and Brazil and Vietnam have achieved trade surpluses for 10 consecutive years. Looking at industry products, 80% of US chips are exported, and about 2/3 of commercial aircraft delivered by Boeing are sold to customers outside of North America. The EU's surpluses for automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and cosmetics in 2025 were $92.2 billion, $214.6 billion, and $11.6 billion, respectively. If we follow the logic that large surpluses inevitably lead to overcapacity, should these industries and products with large exports and large surpluses also be treated as “overcapacity”? The trade surplus is the result of a combination of global industrial division of labor and supply and demand structures, and does not mean overcapacity.

The Ministry of Commerce issued the document “China's Position on the So-Called “Overcapacity” issue on the 28th. The document points out that large exports and large surpluses are not equal to overcapacity. The surplus mainly reflects the difference between gross domestic savings and total investment, and mainly includes a surplus in trade in goods and services. Judging from the history of global economic development, manufacturing powers such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, and Germany have maintained surpluses for a long time, and it is also quite common for Germany and Japan to account for more than 6% of GDP with current account surpluses. Exports from emerging markets are growing rapidly, and Indonesia, Mexico, etc. have all become surplus countries, and Brazil and Vietnam have achieved trade surpluses for 10 consecutive years. Looking at industry products, 80% of US chips are exported, and about 2/3 of commercial aircraft delivered by Boeing are sold to customers outside of North America. The EU's surpluses for automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and cosmetics in 2025 were $92.2 billion, $214.6 billion, and $11.6 billion, respectively. If we follow the logic that large surpluses inevitably lead to overcapacity, should these industries and products with large exports and large surpluses also be treated as “overcapacity”? The trade surplus is the result of a combination of global industrial division of labor and supply and demand structures, and does not mean overcapacity.