In 2026, the United States, Canada and Mexico will jointly host the FIFA World Cup, the largest sporting event ever staged in North America, with 48 teams, expanded venues, and one of the most complex tourism and logistics operations in sports history.
The tournament will inject millions of visitors into U.S. cities from Los Angeles to New York.
Most people assume mega-events like the World Cup bring surges in short-term activity: stadium and infrastructure investment, travel, lodging, hospitality, consumer spending. The event generates excitement, jobs and increased flows — yet those factor did not always translated to stronger economic growth.
So, will the 2026 World Cup give the U.S. economy a lift, or could the country actually fall into a recession while hosting it?
Economists have studied this for decades, and the conclusion is surprisingly consistent: World Cups rarely deliver the economic boom that politicians promise.
Academic studies found that any gains tend to be short-lived and concentrated in specific sectors, while stadium and infrastructure spending often ends up being more costly than beneficial.
The reason is simple: World Cups shift spending rather than create new spending, while infrastructure costs fall heavily on governments.
Bottom line, hosting a World Cup isn't the GDP rocket booster people imagine.
Let's allow the numbers to speak for themselves.
Using World Bank data to compare each host country's GDP growth in its World Cup year to its own long-term historical average, a clear pattern emerges: most host nations post positive growth in the year they stage the tournament, but they generally grow more slowly than they do in a typical year.
Among the 17 World Cup hosts since 1960, 14 recorded positive GDP growth, about 82%. Only two countries, Argentina in 1978 and Mexico in 1986, experienced a recession, while Japan saw stagnation when hosting the tournament in 2002.
However, when each host's World Cup–year growth is compared with its own historical average, the result flips: on average, growth is 1.05 percentage points lower.
In other words, hosting tends to coincide with slightly softer economic performance than a typical year.
| Year | World Cup Hosts | World Cup Year GDP Growth (%) | Historical Avg (%) | Difference (percentage points) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1962 | Chile | 3.9 | 3.9 | 0.0 |
| 1966 | United Kingdom | 1.6 | 2.3 | –0.7 |
| 1970 | Mexico | 6.5 | 3.5 | +3.0 |
| 1974 | Germany | 0.9 | 2.2 | –1.3 |
| 1978 | Argentina | –4.5 | 2.3 | –6.8 |
| 1982 | Spain | 1.2 | 3.2 | –2.0 |
| 1986 | Mexico | –3.9 | 3.5 | –7.4 |
| 1990 | Italy | 2.0 | 2.3 | –0.3 |
| 1994 | United States | 4.0 | 3.0 | +1.0 |
| 1998 | France | 3.5 | 2.7 | +0.8 |
| 2002 | Korea, Rep. | 7.7 | 7.0 | +0.7 |
| 2002 | Japan | 0.0 | 3.3 | –3.3 |
| 2006 | Germany | 3.9 | 2.2 | +1.7 |
| 2010 | South Africa | 3.0 | 2.8 | +0.2 |
| 2014 | Brazil | 0.5 | 3.9 | –3.4 |
| 2018 | Russian Federation | 2.8 | 1.0 | +1.8 |
| 2022 | Qatar | 4.2 | 6.0 | –1.8 |
| Average | 2.1 | 3.25 | –1.05 |
When isolating advanced economies, the pattern only slightly improves. In seven out of eight instances, the World Cup hosts produced a positive economic growth.
However, the economic performance during World Cup years was modest—around 2.1% on average—and still slightly weaker than their usual pace.
The average difference between the advanced economies’ World Cup year GDP and each country's historical average is -0.5 percentage points
The data suggests that hosting the tournament rarely delivers an economic lift and often coincides with growth that is perfectly ordinary, or even somewhat subdued.
| Year | World Cup Hosts | WC GDP Growth (%) | Historical Avg (%) | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1966 | United Kingdom | 1.6 | 2.3 | –0.7 |
| 1974 | Germany | 0.9 | 2.2 | –1.3 |
| 1982 | Spain | 1.2 | 3.2 | –2.0 |
| 1990 | Italy | 2.0 | 2.3 | –0.3 |
| 1994 | United States | 4.0 | 3.0 | +1.0 |
| 1998 | France | 3.5 | 2.7 | +0.8 |
| 2002 | Japan | 0.0 | 3.3 | –3.3 |
| 2006 | Germany | 3.9 | 2.2 | +1.7 |
| Average | 2.1 | 2.6 | -0.5 |
The U.S. hosted the 1994 World Cup during a period of strong economic momentum.
In that year, the U.S. GDP grew at a 4% rate, ranking in the 67th percentile of all U.S. growth outcomes since WWII.
In short, a 4% year outperforms two-thirds of historical U.S. GDP outcomes, or only about one-third of years were stronger.
But was the World Cup responsible? Academic literature says not necessarily so.
Several studies found that hosting the 1994 World Cup delivered no measurable boost to U.S. national income or employment.
The spending it generated was highly localized, producing only small and temporary gains in the host cities, with no detectable macroeconomic effect in the national data.
The strong performance of the U.S. economy that year was instead fueled by a cyclical rebound from the early-1990s recession, accelerating productivity growth, the post–Cold War normalization of defense spending, and supportive Federal Reserve policy.
Economically speaking, the World Cup was a spectator, not a driver.
The 2026 World Cup will be bigger, longer, and more commercially valuable than any previous edition, but the macro forces shaping the U.S. economy are far larger.
While the tournament will certainly boost tourism and hospitality and deliver short-lived booms in host cities, these effects are nowhere near large enough to meaningfully shift a $29 trillion economy.
Historical data suggest that hosting a World Cup rarely translates into stronger GDP performance, even when the analysis is limited to advanced economies.
For the United States in 2026, the event will likely deliver excitement and tourism, but hardly a measurable GDP boom.
Betting markets suggest there is a meaningful risk the U.S. economy could slip into recession during the 2026 World Cup year.
On Polymarket, the probability of a U.S. recession by the end of 2026 sits near 33%, implying a one-in-three chance of a downturn arriving during the year of hosting the tournament.
A $1 bet on the U.S. avoiding a recession by 2026 returns about 45 cents, while wagering on a recession offers a payout closer to $3.
Historically, however, recessions during World Cup host years are rare.
Over the last sixty years, only two hosts—Argentina in 1978 and Mexico in 1986—were in recession while staging the event. That's an 11% historical probability, far lower than what prediction markets are currently pricing.
Yet, if there’s a better guide to the 2026 outlook, it isn't sports, it's politics.
The United States will hold midterm elections in 2026, and these historically have a much stronger link to economic performance.
Out of 20 midterm elections since WWII, only four occurred during an NBER-defined recession (1970, 1974, 1982, 1990), or 20% of the time.
In short, while prediction markets see heightened recession risk, historical patterns around both World Cups and U.S. midterms suggest downturns during these years are more the exception than the norm.
| Midterm Year (Post WWII) | Recession During Midterm Year? | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 1946 | No | — |
| 1950 | No | — |
| 1954 | No | Recession ended in May 1954, before the November election |
| 1958 | No | Recession ended in April 1958 |
| 1962 | No | — |
| 1966 | No | — |
| 1970 | Yes | Economy inside the Dec 1969 – Nov 1970 recession |
| 1974 | Yes | Economy inside the Nov 1973 – Mar 1975 recession |
| 1978 | No | — |
| 1982 | Yes | Economy inside the Jul 1981 – Nov 1982 recession |
| 1986 | No | — |
| 1990 | Yes | Economy inside the Jul 1990 – Mar 1991 recession |
| 1994 | No | — |
| 1998 | No | — |
| 2002 | No | 2001 recession ended before the midterm |
| 2006 | No | — |
| 2010 | No | Great Recession ended June 2009 |
| 2014 | No | — |
| 2018 | No | — |
| 2022 | No | No NBER recession in 2022 |
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Image created using artificial intelligence via Gemini.